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Peace-Building
JOHN LINARELLI*
Development is the most secure basis for peace.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War has presented the United Nations with
significant opportunities. The development of peace through law rather
than through self-interested unilateral military action by states is, and
should be, one of the most important agendas of the United Nations.'
In his Agenda for Peace,3 United Nations Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali identified post-conflict peace-building as an integral part
of the United Nations' efforts to maintain international peace and
security. As explained by one author, "[tihe United Nations must de-
velop the ability to address the root causes of the ethnic strife, poverty,
and anarchy that give rise to the need for multilateral peace opera-
tions," and such operations "should be viewed as crisis management of
the last resort."' Indeed, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944,
the United States, Great Britain, and the then Soviet Union articulat-
ed the very foundations of the United Nations to be "both to prevent
aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of
war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving
peoples."5 History has demonstrated that military operations cannot
create peace, but at most can stabilize a conflict so that peace-building
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1. An Agenda for Development: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., Agenda Item 91, U.N. Doc. A/48/935 (1994) [hereinafter Agenda for De-
velopment].
2. Myres S. McDougal, Law and Peace, 18 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1
(1989).
3. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary General
Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council
on 31 January 1992 [hereinafter Agenda for Peace).
4. GARY S. SHARP, SR., UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS: A COLLECTION OF
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS AND READINGS GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF MULTILATERAL
PEACE OPERATIONS xii (1995)..
5. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, UNITED NATIONS, EVERYONE'S UNITED
NATIONS: A HANDBOOK ON THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 8 (10th ed. 1986).
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can be given an opportunity to work.6 With the shortcomings of peace-
building efforts in Somalia' and ongoing efforts to build a democratic
state in Haiti, it is unknown whether the United Nations in the post
Cold War period will by itself prove able to conduct credible and effec-
tive peace-building activities.
Peace-building as well as preventive diplomacy are viewed, in the
United Nations scheme, as adjuncts to peace-keeping and peace-mak-
ing efforts under Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter."
In essence, these functions can be viewed as part of a seamless web of
activities designed to create the conditions for long-term peace and
ultimately to maintain peace. The preferred view is that peace-building
should occur prior to a conflict as a preventive measure as well as
after a conflict to avoid recurrence of the conflict.9 As explained in
Agenda for Peace:
(T]he concept of peace-building as the construction of a new envi-
ronment should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplo-
macy, which seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions.
When conflict breaks out, mutually reinforcing efforts at peace-
making and peace-keeping come into play. Once these have
achieved their objectives, only sustained, cooperative work to deal
with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian prob-
lems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation. Preven-
tive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peace-building is to
prevent a recurrence."°
This article will explore the theoretical and pragmatic foundations for
peace-building." It will examine the possibilities for "an integrated
approach to human security" proposed by the Secretary General in his
Agenda for Peace."
A comprehensive definition of peace-building is not possible. No
definition could fully encompass all of the relevant differences that
6. This point was suggested by Lieutenant Colonel Gary S. Sharp, Sr. Deputy
Counsel, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense and Adjunct
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. All points as referenced herein were
made by Professor Sharp in a purely personal capacity.
7. The United Nations undertook peace-building in Somalia as part of
UNOSOM II, its last effort in Somalia. This effort is widely perceived to have been
unsuccessful. This is in contrast to United Nations humanitarian relief efforts in
Operation Restore Hope, designed to alleviate mass starvation in the country. Opera-
tion Restore Hope is widely perceived to be successful. See JOHN L. HIRSCH & ROB-
ERT B. OAKLEY, SOMAUA AND OPERATION RESTORE HOPE 49, 101 (1995).
8. See Agenda for Peace, supra note 3, at 11.
9. This point was suggested by Professor Gary S. Sharp, Sr., supra note 6.
10. Agenda for Peace, supra note 3, at 33.
11. It is beyond the scope of this article to address the "doability" of achieving
peace-building initiatives. The enormity of this task should not be downplayed. I
leave this topic to other articles and other authors.
12. Agenda for Peace, supra note 3, at 8.
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exist in rebuilding failed states. Each situation tends to pose difficul-
ties based on historical circumstances of the country and region. Sec-
tion II will nevertheless seek to define the concept in general terms by
identifying substantive criteria that can be used to delimit the concept.
These criteria have their basis in empirical and theoretical analysis of
events and situations that mitigate or minimize conflict among nations
and, hence, build peace. Section II will show remarkable congruences
between domestic economic development and minimization of civil and
international conflict. It is very important to define norms to govern
peace-building in order to, among other things, avoid intervention in
the domestic affairs of states and to critically assess what should be
done to rehabilitate failed states and place them on the path of sound
economic, political, and social development.
Section III will address the legal authority for the United Nations'
conduct of peace-building initiatives. It will examine the state of inter-
national law on the subject and attempt to interpret some arguments
and principles in conjunction with one another that have heretofore
not been considered contemporaneously. It will examine whether the
Security Council has the authority to impose peace-building, or wheth-
er other organizations, both inside and outside of the United Nations,
should undertake peace-building. Section III will address the structur-
al inadequacies in the presently ordered international system. These
inadequacies prevent comprehensive peace-building efforts on a multi-
lateral scale. Section WV of the article will provide concluding observa-
tions.
II. PEACE-BUILDING CRITERIA - THE STATE OF EMERGING NORMS
The United Nations Secretary General has described peace-build-
ing as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into con-
flict.""3 What are the norms which govern peace-building? Can one
articulate which "action" and "structures" will "tend to strengthen and
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict?""' This section
13. I. at 11; Agenda for Development, supra note 1, at 6.
14. Agenda for Peace, supra note 3, at 11. A related question is whether the
United Nations must wait for a conflict, and resolve the conflict, before it engages in
peace-building. The Secretary General's definition may be unduly narrow. His defini-
tion skirts the issue of whether peace-building in the absence of conflict would result
in intervention in violation of Article 2 (7) of the Charter. A "conflict" can be defined
to be almost anything to the creative draftsman, although to give the term an overt-
ly political meaning could threaten the credibility of the Security Council. In my
view, given current social science and international relations studies on the issue of
what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, namely non-democratic
public order, it would seem that peace-building should not have to wait for the exis-
tence and termination of a conflict. See infra part IIIA A policy-oriented definition
of peace-building would be something like "realization of community expectations
about peace and security," with the United Nations Charter and other international
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tries to fill in the details of what peace-building should entail based on
legally-centered analytical principles.
In order to derive norms governing peace-building, two points
should be assessed. First, the identified norms are policies, or basic
principles, rather than rules. An excessively rule-based order would be
unduly difficult to describe and apply. There is no set of rules that
could be applied successfully in every peace-building effort. Each situa-
tion poses unique problems. There are, however, certain characteristics
or properties, that, when present, could result in effective peace-build-
ing. The more important of these characteristics are examined in this
section.
Second, norms should be segregated from tasks. For example, a
peace-building norm may be to ensure the human rights associated
with security of the individual; another may be promote sustainable
agricultural development. A task intended to implement these norms
would be the clearing of mines from a country. The United Nations has
undertaken a number of peace-building efforts, beginning virtually
from its creation forward. 5 A good deal of these efforts were under-
taken during the decolonization process and by assisting states in the
transition from trust territory status. 6 The tasks that the United Na-
tions has undertaken include election monitoring, establishment of
conditions for elections by beginning the reconstruction of civil society,
rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, repatriation and resettlement
of refugees, supervision and monitoring of cease fires, disarming of
armed factions, mine-clearing, and training and supervision of law
enforcement personnel."
These are the initial tasks in peace-building. Established develop-
ment thinking holds that development is a long-term process, particu-
larly in lesser developed countries marred by armed conflict. These
countries suffer from egregious problems relating to poverty and to
lack of development. Serious peace-building efforts would have to re-
flect a coherent development strategy based on achievement of goals or
norms that promote peace. Set forth below are the most important
norms that the above tasks and other, longer term efforts should strive
to meet in order to promote international peace and security.
A. Good Governance and Democracy
International relations theorists have asserted that non-democrat-
ic national orders constitute a threat to international peace and securi-
documents providing guidance on what those community expectations would be.
15. See Sonia K Han, Note, Building A Peace That Lasts: The United Nations
And Post-Civil War Peace-Building, 26 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 837 (1994).
16. Id. at 841.
17. Id. at 847-49.
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ty because non-democratic regimes tend to go to war with one another.
As explained by Professor John N. Moore:
[LJiberal democracy and the rule of law (in the broadest sense) are
valuable to the new world order centrally and fundamentally be-
cause an impressive body of human knowledge now tells us unmis-
takably that there is a direct correlation between these concepts
and: human rights, the avoidance of government-sponsored
"democide" (the massive killing of a nation's own population and
the most extreme human rights failure of government), vigorous
economic progress, and the avoidance of a synergy that has pro-
duced the major international wars of this century. In short, the
spread of liberal democracy, or at least the minimization of totali-
tarianism, is of the greatest importance in realizing fundamental
human aspirations. 8
These conclusions are based on the empirical analysis of Professor
Rudy Rummel, Professor Bruce Russett, and others." The proposi-
tions of these scholars have not gone unchallenged.' One study in the
international relations area suggests that states in the early stages of
democratization are more likely to engage in military conflict than
states that have had no change in regime."' This new evidence, or
interpretation of old evidence, does not alter the basic proposition that
states which have completed the transition to democracy virtually
never engage in military conflict with each other. These competing con-
clusions on the empirical data also suggest that the reconciliation of
this data may be based on how one defines democracy. A democracy
that reflects significant and enduring participatory pluralism, in which
citizens have the ability and actually do more than merely vote in
elections and in which rule of law is of importance to the state and
reflects democratic values, provides the basis for a mature democracy
highly unlikely to engage in, or at least start, armed conflict. Elections
alone do not qualify a country as a democracy;' there must be some
other long-term indicia. Haiti held presidential, parliamentary, and
18. John N. Moore, Morality and the Rule of Law in the Foreign Policy of the
Democracies 1-2 (Nov. 14, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author,
prepared for the Andrew R. Cecil Lectures on Moral Values in a Free Society, Uni-
versity of Texas at Dallas); see also Robert F. Turner, Haiti and the Growth of a
Democracy Entitlement, in THE UNITED NATIONS AT FIFrY: SOvEREIGNTY, PEACEKEEP-
ING, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 18, 23-24 (Don M. Snider & Stuart J.D. Schwartzstein
eds., 1995).
19. RUDY J. RUMMEL, DEADLIER THAN WAR: NON-FREEDOM (1986); RUDY J.
RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT (1994); BRUCE M. RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMo-
CRATIC PEACE: PRiNCIPLES FOR A PosT-CoLD WAR WORLD (1993).
20. See JOHN N. MOORE ET AL., NATONAL SECURITY LAW 77-78 (1990).
21. Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratization and War, 74 FOREIGN
AFF. 79, 79-80 (May/June 1995).
22. See Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARv. INTL
L.J. 1 (1995); Tom Farer, The Hierarchy of Human Rights, 8 AM. U. J. INTL L, &
POL" 115, 116-17 (1992).
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local elections in 1990. These elections did not make Haiti a democracy
by any stretch of the concept, particularly since the elected President,
Jean Bertrande Aristide, was forcibly removed from office by the Hai-
tian military less than one year later.'
International relations theorists have avoided normative conclu-
sions about preferences in governing political systems, leaving the
tasks of norm prescription to others. International law scholars have
taken on the task and have found an emerging norm of democratic
governance.2 Although this democratic norm is nascent and not with-
out its detractors, it has been persuasively argued that democratically
elected governments may in some cases provide legitimacy to a govern-
ment on the international level.'
Recent events in Haiti provide significant support for the demo-
cratic norm. On July 31, 1994, the Security Council voted 12-0 to pass
Resolution 940 which, among other things, authorized force "to use all
necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military
leadership ... [and] the prompt return of the legitimately elected
President"' and directed United Nations officials to "assist the legiti-
mate constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment
conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections,"'
to be monitored by the United Nations and the Organization of Ameri-
can States. China, a permanent member of the Security Council, ab-
stained and its delegate expressed concern that the Resolution created
a "dangerous precedent."'
23. Oversight of the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-
tices for 1993 and U.S. Human Rights Policy: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1994).
24. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46, 47 (1992) [hereinafter Democratic Governance); Ibrahim J. Gassama,
World Order in the Post-Cold War Era: The Relevance and Role of the United Na-
tions After ifty Years, 20 BROOK J. INT'L L. 255 (1994); Richard Lee Gaines, On
the Road to a Paz U.N.: Using the Peace Tools at Our Disposal in a Post-Cold War
World, 25 N.Y.U.J. INTL L. & POL. 543, 585 (1993); Thomas M. Franck, United
Nations Based Prospects for a New Global Order, 22 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 601,
621 (1990) [hereinafter New Global Order].
25. Democratic Governance, supra note 24. Because of the overwhelming number
of burgeoning democracies today in the United Nations, given the demise of the Cold
War, it is apparently much easier today to make an argument for a democratic
norm, or against an authoritarian regime. The major "norm blocker" in this effort is
China - approximately one in four people are still governed by an authoritarian
regime. If sovereignty is based on the contemporary notions of popular sovereignty of
people legitimizing governments through proper elections, China and other authori-
tarian regimes are in violation of international law.
26. Turner, supra note 18, at 21-22.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 22.
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights mandates that popu-
lar government is an internationally protected human right. Article
21(1) provides that "[elveryone has the right to take part in the gov-
ernment of his country, directly or through freely chosen representa-
tives."' 9 Article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration provides as follows:
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of govern-
ment; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures."0
Philosophers and ethicists have proffered further normative justi-
fication for democracy. Immanuel Kant posited that peace could be
predicated upon a "pacific union" of democratic states." Democracy
has been asserted by one historian to be an ethical standard.32
The United Nations itself has recognized the relationship of de-
mocracy to peace. In fact, in its peace-building initiatives to date, the
United Nations has proffered participatory democracy as the model for
building post-conflict societies.3 In Agenda for Peace, the Secretary
General explained as follows:
There is an obvious connection between democratic practices -
such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making - and
the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable
political order. These elements of good governance need to be pro-
moted at all levels of international and national political communi-
ties.'
The Secretary General has also stated:
There can be no flowering of development without the parallel
advance of another key concept: democratization. Peace is a prereq-
uisite to development; democracy is essential if development is to
succeed over the long term.
The real development of a State must be based on the participation
of its population; that requires human rights and democracy.'
29. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21 1, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
217A (III), pt. 1, at 75, U.N. doc. A/777 (1948).
30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21 13, U.N. GAOR, d. Sess.,
217A (I1), pt. 1, at 75, U.N. doc. A/777 (1948).
31. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (1795).
32. James T. Johnson, Is Democracy an Ethical Standard? 4 ETHICS [N INVL
AF. 1, 17 (1990). "Democracy as an ethical standard for life in political community
is the counterpart of freedom as an ethical standard in the life of the individual -
both are needed for the moral life within the conditions of history as we know it."
Id.
33. Han, supra note 15, at 837-38.
34. Agenda for Peace, supra note 3, at 34.
35. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Report on the World of the Organization from the
Forty-Seventh to the Forty-Eighth Session of the General Assembly 2-3 (1993), quot-
ed in Michael Stopford, Locating the Balance: The United Nations and the New
1996 259
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The Secretary General extends the Moore/Rummel analysis of
democracy as necessary for peace maintenance by finding that democ-
racy is necessary for development as well. Democracy has two interre-
lated dimensions - domestic and international - gover-
nance/development and maintenance of peace. The interconnection be-
tween democracy and development is explained in Agenda for Develop-
ment as follows:
Democracy and development are linked in fundamental ways. They
are linked because democracy provides the only long-term basis for
managing competing ethnic, religious, and cultural interests in a
way that minimizes the risk of violent internal conflict. They are
linked because democracy is inherently attached to the question of
governance, which has an impact on all aspects of development
efforts. They are linked because democracy is a fundamental hu-
man right, the advancement of which is itself an important mea-
sure of development. They are linked because people's participation
in the decision-making processes which affect their lives is a basic
tenet of development."
It is significant that the Secretary General relates democracy to
good governance. In this manner, political difficulties with the promo-
tion of democracy may be defused. The World Bank imposes the con-
cept of good governance on the developing countries, although the
Bank is precluded by its Articles of Agreement from involvement in
political affairs and does not require that states be democratic in order
to qualify for financing. 7 The Bank justifies conditions relating to
governance as affecting the ability of a country to administer and pay
back World Bank loans and as affecting the ability of a country to
effect economic development.' The United Nations appears to be bor-
rowing the governance concept, which has been interpreted as non-
political in order to mitigate criticism."9 The relationship between de-
velopment and democracy is similar in robustness to the relationship
between peace and democracy. Empirical studies have shown that "no
substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic
form of government and a free press."' ° Current thinking in develop-
ment economics suggests that democratic pluralism and the small
entrepreneur are the engines of development. Participatory pluralism
has been shown to be a motivator of economic development." A civil
World Disorder, 34 VA. J. INTrL L. 685, 687 (1994).
36. Agenda for Development, supra note 1, at 22.
37. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
38. Id.
39. But see Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World
Bank and the Democratization of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 159 (1993).
40. Jon Elster, The Impact of Constitutions on Economic Performance, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
209, 213 (Michael Bruno & Boris Pleskovic eds., 1994).
41. See James H. Weaver & Kevin M. O'Keefe, Whither Development Economics?,
VOL. 24:2,3260
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society is necessary for economic development; a country cannot truly
have laws and a legal system, which are necessary for development
and for a market-oriented economic system necessary for development,
without democracy."2 Democracy can be viewed as necessary to the
development of a legal system that will be complementary and benefi-
cial to economic development.
B. Sustainable Development
Contemporary thought on issues of the development of nations
identify sustainable development as the goal of development efforts.'
Principles of sustainable development require that development poli-
cies "incorporate environmental considerations." Sustainable devel-
opment is viewed as "inherently an intergenerational question as well
as an intragenerational question."' In other words, sustainable devel-
opment "relies on a commitment to equity with future generations."'
The United Nations' Agenda for Development sets forth a strong com-
mitment to sustainable development.'7 Certainly, sustainable develop-
ment must be a norm in peace-building.
Sustainable development policies may be implemented through
environmental assessment procedures developed by the United Nations
with the broad-based support of its members. All of the development
banks now make environmental assessments in their lending process-
es. The United Nations may refer to the experiences of the develop-
ment banks for guidance. In any process of developing and applying
environmental assessment procedures, attempts to encourage the tar-
get state to implement environmental assessment should be maxi-
mized. Responsibility of the target state should serve to maximize pop-
ular participation by the indigenous population of the target state and
should serve to result in local solutions to environmental problems. In
this sense, the United Nations can promote participatory pluralism in
addition to environmental protection.' The probability of compliance
SAIS REV. 113 (1991); John Linarelli, The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development: Legal and Policy Issues, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 361, 364-65
(1995); Thomas M. Franck, The New Development: Can American Law and Legal
Institutions Help Developing Countries?, 1972 WiS. L. REv. 767, 773 (1972); see gen-
erally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVIsIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE
THIRD WORLD (1989).
42. See David M. Trubeck, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the
Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE L. J. 1, 6-10 (1972).
43. Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable Devel-
opment, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 19 (1992); see Linarelli, supra note 41, at 370-
73.
44. Agenda for Development, supra note 1, at 14.
45. Weiss, supra note 43, at 19 (emphasis in original).
46. Id.
47. Agenda for Development, supra note 1, at 13-17.
48. See Han, supra note 15, at 853.
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should increase with the involvement of the local populace in decisions
affecting their own welfare and the welfare of their succeeding gen-
erations. This approach should also serve to alleviate the "confidence
crisis" that is perceived to be ongoing in the developing countries.'
The maximization of local popular participation in environmental
decision-making does not mean that the target state should bear sole
responsibility for the costs of environmental protection. Environmental
problems inevitably involve externalities; countries other than the
target state may benefit significantly from environmental projects in
the target state. Environmental problems do not respect political
boundaries.'
C. Human Rights
Peace and respect for human rights are closely interconnected.
Professor Myres McDougal has described the relationship between
peace and human rights as follows:
The most relevant conception of peace must make reference to the
least possible application of violence and coercion to the individual
human being and to the freedom of access of the individual to all
cherished values. For community members and their decision-mak-
ers alike, a viable conception of peace cannot today be limited to
reference to a mere absence of armed, and international, conflict.
The peace demanded by contemporary humankind is not that of the
concentration camp (however large) or that of the living dead
(whatever the community).6'
Peace thus may be broadly based on "optimum order" rather than
on "minimum order," that is, on "the greatest access of the individual
human being to the shaping and sharing of all of the values of human
dignity."52 In this sense, sovereignty is "popular sovereignty" held by
individuals and not by a state or in substance by the elites of a
state."
Development and respect for human rights are also closely inter-
connected. As explained by Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, General Counsel of
the World Bank, "the essence of development encompasses not only
higher incomes but also better education, higher standards of health
and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, more equality of
opportunity, greater individual freedom and a richer cultural life.""
49. This point was made by Abdikarim A. Omar, former Ambassador of Somalia
to the United States, in a presentation in the course, United Nations Peace Opera-
tions, held at the Georgetown University Law Center in Summer 1995.
50. See Linarelli, supra note 41, at 372-73.
51. McDougal, supra note 2, at 5.
52. Id at 6.
53. W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies,
18 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 794, 795 (1995).
54. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Human Rights, Development, and International Finan-
VOL. 24:2,3
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According to Mr. Shihata, "a guarantee of human rights protection
does not merely relate to development but is central to the develop-
ment process."" Human rights protections in the development process
thus refer to economic and social rights as well as civil and political
rights.
Without human rights protections, economic growth cannot be
achieved in the long-term. An effective human rights system protects
the rights of labor and industry. Certain human rights, such as free-
dom of speech, have a routing-out function as they serve to publicize
corruption and governmental abuses of power. A strong sense of civil
society is vital to any truly free economic system; without it, economic
freedom could degenerate into unprincipled greed. Capitalism must be
regulated by the mores and ethics of a society.
The United Nations Charter provides ample authority for human
rights promotion as an important role in peace-building. The purposes
and principles set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter reflect hu-
man rights, economic, and social concerns as well as concerns over the
maintenance of international peace and security.' As explained by
one authoritative text:
In the preamble of the Charter, the peoples of the United Nations
have reaffirmed their "faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men
and women and of nations large and small," and their determina-
tion "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larg-
er freedom." Article 1 of the Charter lists among the main purposes
of the United nations the achievement of international cooperation
"in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion." Similarly, in accordance with Article 55 of
the Charter, the United Nations has the duty to promote "universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or
religion." In Article 56, all Members of the United Nations "pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Arti-
cle 55.
The Charter of the United Nations contains also significant grants
of power to various organ of the United Nations. Thus, under Arti-
cle 13, the General Assembly has the duty to initiate studies and
make recommendations for the purpose of "assisting in the realiza-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Responsibility for the
discharge of the functions set forth in Chapter IX of the Char-
cial Institutions, 8 Am. U. J. INVL L. & POLY 27, 28 (1992).
55. Id
56. See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of
State Responsibility, 43 INVL & COMP. L. Q. 55, 91 (1994).
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ter... is vested by Article 60 in the General Assembly, and "un-
der the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and
Social Council." In discharging this responsibility, the Economic
and Social Council may, according to Article 62, "make recommen-
dations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all ....
Indeed, a convincing argument can be made that certain human
rights are jus cogens and must be respected regardless of the terms of
the Charter." It would be an impermissible leap of logic, however, to
say that the United Nations and its member states are obligated to
enforce peremptory norms. It would be problematic to have the United
Nations involved in interpreting international law to determine when
to override the Charter.
The United Nations, since the adoption of the Charter, has pro-
moted human rights as an integral aspect of peace. It has promulgated
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights,'" the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,6 and numerous other conven-
tions, declarations, and resolutions promoting human rights. The Unit-
ed Nations in this manner has been one of the primary actors in the
development of customary international law in the human rights area.
Neither the United Nations nor other international institutions in-
volved in peace-building could credibly ignore human rights issues in
peace-building.
D. Rule of Law
Democratic governance and rule of law are closely related." Rule
of law is separated here for purposes of analysis.
Rule of law, broadly defined, has a direct relationship to the main-
tenance of peace.' It operationalizes the most important character-
istics of a participatory democracy and of a system designed to protect
human rights. It facilitates stability, accountability, and credibility of
regimes." According to Professor McDougal:
The basic community policies that underlie conceptions of peace
and human rights are in any democratic community the same poli-
57. Eighteenth Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace,
the United Nations and Human Rights, 1-4 (1968), reprinted in MOORE ET AL, su-
pra note 20, at 676.
58. See Shihata, supra note 54, at 35.
59. See Turner, supra note 18.
60. G.A Res. 2200, 21 GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
61. GA. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).





cies that underlie all law. Hence, it is no metaphor to conclude that
peace and law may appropriately be described as one side of the
coin (of community process and effective power) of which arbitrary
violence and coercion are the other side.M6
Rule of law also has a direct relationship to development and
hence to maintenance of peace. As one prominent scholar of law and
development posits, "[like a power grid or transportation network,
modern law is viewed in the core conception as a functional prereq-
uisite of an industrial economy."" There has been a serious decline in
scholarly inquiry in law and development."7 Nevertheless, law plays a
significant role in the development of a nation-state, although its ef-
fects may be extremely difficult to identify, categorize and quantify.
Despite the decline in scholarly inquiry, multilateral development
institutions, such as the World Bank, and bilateral agencies, such as
the U.S. Agency for International Development, continue to fund nu-
merous projects for legal reform in developing countries.'
Law is critical to the sustenance of a market-oriented economic
system. A market-oriented economic system is currently viewed as the
most promising economic system for development. Market institutions,
such as commercial banking, central banks, currency, market pricing,
market commodity distribution, and the commodification of real prop-
erty, depend on law for their existence. Law is essential to the exis-
tence of such institutions. Law serves these institutions by identifying
and preserving property rights and contract rights, and by defining
and facilitating such concepts as negotiable instruments, commercial
paper, juristic personhood, secured transactions, and title to real prop-
erty. It makes for predictability "as a set of universal rules uniformly
applied," 9 which "encourages men to engage in new forms of econom-
ic activity and guarantees that the fruits of this activity will be pro-
tected.7 Law "assures the individual that his decisions will be en-
65. McDougal, supra note 2, at 6.
66. Trubek, supra note 42, at 6.
67. See John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Ori-
gins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J.
CoM. L. 457 (1977); Elliot Burg, Law and Development: A Review of the Literature
and a Critique of "Scholars in Self-Estrangement," 25 AM. J. CoMP. L. 492 (1977);
Philip von Mehren & Tim Sawers, Revitalizing the Law and Development Movement:
A Case Study of Title in Thailand, 33 HARV. IN'L L. J. 67 (1992).
68. See HARRY BLAIR & GARY HANSEN, WEIGHING IN ON THE SCALES OF JUS-
TICE: STRATEGIc APPROACHES FOR DONOR-SUPPORTED RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS,
USAID PROGRAM AND OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT REPORT NO. 7 (1994); U.S. General
Accounting Office, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: PROMOTING JUDICIAL REFORM TO STRENGTH-
EN DEMOCRACIES (1993).
69. Trubek, supra note 42, at 7.
70. Id.
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forced by state authority and that his acquisitions protected from the
depredations of others."7
Moreover, law can serve as an instrument through which a state
implements development plans.72 This role of law has been
downplayed in recent years as development economists and planners
have reasoned that economic growth is impracticable to manage and
government intervention is sometimes worse than no, or limited, inter-
vention despite good intentions.73 This second role for law, however,
still appears significant to the extent that it promotes an open, mar-
ket-oriented economy. For example, given the intense competition of
the capital importing countries for foreign capital, developing countries
have been promulgating foreign investment laws that are favorable to
the foreign investor and that serve to protect foreign investments with-
in a country. Today's trend is privatization, not nationalization. Devel-
oping countries use law to attempt to direct foreign investment into
their borders as part of their development plans, which include in-
creasing foreign investment.
E. Market-Oriented Economics and Liberalized Trade
A substantial relationship exists between international trade
policy and the prevention of armed conflict. 4 This relationship has
been demonstrated in modern history leading to World War II. The
Smoot Hawley Tariff Act, signed into law in June of 1930, dramatically
increased United States tariffs in an unequivocal protectionist or isola-
tionist approach to international relations.7 5 The result was retalia-
tion by trading partners of the United States. As other countries dra-
matically increased their tariffs, the volume of world trade substantial-
ly decreased, eventually leading to the Great Depression. The Great
Depression was a substantial contributing factor to the decline of the
political moderates in Japan and to the electoral victory of the Nazis in
Germany. 6 A dire economic situation created the conditions for the
rise of extreme, totalitarian or authoritarian, non-democratic regimes,
which in turn started one of the most aggressive wars in recorded
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Clive Crook, The Gains from Trade, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 1989, at 25;
Clive Crook, Distracted by Debt, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 1989, at 52.
74. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC
RELATIONS 37 (1995).
75. RICHARD N. COOPER, TRADE POLICY AND FOREIGN POLICY 291-92, reprinted in
JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
38 (1995); John Linarelli, International Trade Relations and the Separation of Powers
Under the United States Constitution, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 203, 210 (1995).
76. COOPER, supra note 75.
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history." Thus, flawed protectionist trade policies can be viewed as
one contributing cause of World War II.
U.S. leaders during World War II understood the close connection
between protectionist trade policy and war. As explained by one State
Department official in 1944:
We've seen that when a country gets starved out economically, its
people are all too ready to follow the first dictator who may rise up
and promise them all jobs. Trade conflict breeds non-cooperation,
suspicion, bitterness. Nations which are economic enemies are not
likely to remain political friends for long.7"
The United States at the end of World War II promoted the cre-
ation of three multilateral economic institutions - the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (known as the World Bank),
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Trade
Organization. Only the first two of these organizations came into exis-
tence. The World Bank at the time served to rebuild war ravaged
countries. The IMF was created to promote orderly fluctuations and
adjustments of currencies and exchange rates. The International Trade
Organization, however, did not come into existence because of the
opposition of the U.S. Congress. The proposal of the United States
Executive Branch for the creation of the International Trade Organiza-
tion stated:
The fundamental choice is whether countries will struggle against
each other for wealth and power, or work together for security and
mutual advantage .... The experience of cooperation in the task
of earning a living promotes both the habit and the techniques of
common effort and helps make permanent the mutual confidence
on which the peace depends."9
In the post Cold War era, "economic diplomacy" has acquired
increased prominence. "U.S. national security policy no longer focuses
primarily on the conventional notions relating to the use of force, arms
control and arms proliferation, national defense, and superpower con-
flict." There has been a dynamic linkage in United States foreign
policy of international economic and non-economic relations.
National security provides an even less convincing justification for
deviating from free trade principles. National security was even cited
by Adam Smith for permitting the protection of certain strategic
industries."' Nevertheless, as linkages between free trade, mutually
77. Id
78. U.S. Dept. of State, Commercial Policy Series 74, at 3 (Pub. no. 2104, 1944),
quoted in JACKSON ET AL, supra note 74, at 38.
79. United States Proposals, Dept. of State Pub. No. 2411, at 1-2 (1946), quoted
in JACKSON ET AL, supra note 74, at 38-39.
80. Linarelli, supra note 75, at 203.
81. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF IN-
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pursued, and conflict minimization become ever more apparent, the
national security argument loses force.
The developing countries, which are the countries in which the
United Nations peace-keeping efforts are most likely to occur, have
moved quite steadily towards trade liberalization.82 The trend in the
developing countries toward trade liberalization is consistent with
trends in development economics toward privatization, private sector
development, aggressive export orientation trade strategies, and the
promotion of entrepreneurship, particularly the entrepreneurship of
small and medium sized enterprises, as the engine of development.'
Once again, these concepts reinforce and complement the ultimate goal
of the creation and maintenance of a stable state. Entrepreneurship is
also viewed as the engine of democratic pluralism. "
Unfortunately, as the developing countries embrace trade liberal-
ization, it appears that the developed countries' commitment to free
trade may be diminishing.8 A lack of commitment to trade liberaliza-
tion on behalf of the developing countries would be a serious mistake.
Such retrenchment often has its roots in politics, such as when one
region of a developed country demands protection from a developing
country's imports.8 Despite the dangerous temptation to succumb to
such protectionism, it is not in the long-term interests of peace- build-
ing. It appears dangerously reminiscent of the Smoot Hawley debacle.
F. Structural Adjustment
Closely related to the concept of building peace through trade is
the concept of implementing structural adjustment in countries experi-
encing serious economic problems. Structural adjustment "refers to the
process by which economic factors such as land, labor and capital are
reallocated within a country as it adapts in order to function more
efficiently as part of the global economy.""7 The structural adjustment
process typically results in hardships to a country and its populace in
the short-run, including unemployment, currency devaluation, and
closing of inefficient industries."
The IMF and the World Bank, as part of their conditions for pro-
viding credits or loans to countries, may impose strict economic criteria
TERNATIONAL ECONOMic RELATIoNs 18-19 (1992).
82. Bertram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 374-76 (1994).
83. Unarelli, supra note 41, at 364-65.
84. Id.
85. Brown, supra note 82, at 374-75.
86. See Brown, supra note 82, at 365-69, 398-99. The author explains the delete-
rious economic effects of such protectionism.




that a country must meet in order for the country to draw on its loan
or credit." These conditions reflect an essentially capitalist view of
the world and have been the subject of political consternation among
the developing countries that view these conditions as an encroach-
ment on sovereignty and a continuation of colonialism.9 Nevertheless,
structural adjustment is critical for long-run economic growth. Ulti-
mately, structural adjustment will promote economic well-being and,
hence, peace.
Structural adjustment may prove necessary in order to mitigate
the externalities of armed conflict. Armed conflict may result in shocks
to the world economy. Countries dependent on resources from warring
countries may suffer severe economic disadvantages. For example,
Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in August 1990 caused a sharp increase in
oil prices and a severe weakening of the balance of payments posture
of many oil importing countries. 1 Some countries were adversely af-
fected by physical dislocations and lost receipts of remittances from
their nationals working in Iraq and Kuwait. 2 Countries in the pro-
cess of structural adjustment had to adapt their policies to the changed
circumstances.93 After the conflict, reconstruction and recovery in the
region was necessary.9 Both the IMF and the World Bank played
roles in alleviating the adverse economic consequences of the con-
flict.95
G. Deterrence Mechanisms to Avoid Reversion to Conflict
In the nation-state ordered system of international relations that
presently exists, deterrence plays a key role in maintaining peace.
"[Dleterrence has served as a central component of governmental poli-
cies in this contemporary Charter era.... .' Professor Donald
Kagen, a noted historian, has examined the causes of war since the
Peloponnesian War to the contemporary period and concludes as fol-
lows on the importance of deterrence:
What seems to work best, even though imperfectly, is the posses-
sion by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the prepon-
derant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibili-
ties required to achieve that purpose. They must understand that
no international situation is permanent, that part of their responsi-
89. PAUL B. STEPHAN [I ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BusINESS AND EcoNoMics: LAW
AND POLICY 245-46 (1993).
90. Id
91. DAVID M. CHENEY, DEALING WITH THE UNEXPECTED: THE IMFS RESPONSE
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bility is to accept and sometime even assist changes, some of which
they will not like, guiding their achievement through peaceful
channels, but always prepared to resist, with force if necessary,
changes made by threats or violence that threaten the general
peace. But this condition is not easy to achieve. In the first place,
the natural distribution of power does not necessarily coincide with
the needs of peacekeeping, Sometimes the balance is so close as to
prevent effective deterrence and to make it tempting to risk war to
gain or prevent a preponderance of power .... Sometimes the
power and will are present but the responsible states are arrogant
and careless."
An effective deterrence system could be implemented by one state
or by a group of states. The United Nations, particularly the operation
of the Security Council through Chapter VII of the Charter, could come
to represent an effective deterrence mechanism. 8 Based on current
events in Bosnia and previously in Somalia, it would appear that the
United Nations has a long road ahead in order to become effective in
this area. The primary burden thus falls upon individual states, either
unilaterally or though the United Nations, to serve as the primary
implementers of deterrence throughout the world.
H. Disarmament and Nonproliferation
Peace-building requires both disarmament and nonproliferation.
The end of the Cold War and the advance of technology have resulted
in more complex scenarios and in a multiplicity of actors with the
ability to initiate armed conflict and, in some instances, to even ini-
tiate nuclear conflict."
An effective system of disarming states and of engaging states in
nonproliferation obligations is plainly in the interests of peace-build-
ing. The United Nations has on occasion sought to disarm factions in a
conflict." In the case of Somalia, the United Nations has been criti-
cized for not disarming the Somali factions at the outset of the Chap-
ter VII operation in that country."1 This type of ad hoc disarmament
is clearly prudent. But, disarmament as a peace-building effort must
be extensive, systematic, and permanent in nature.
97. DONALD KAGAN, ON THE ORIGINS OF WAR AND THE PRESERVATION OF
PEACE 570 (1995); see also JOHN N. MOORE, CRISIS IN THE GULF (1992).
98. See SHARP, supra note 4, at 82-85.
99. David A. Koplow & Philip G. Schrag, Carrying a Big Carrot: Linking Multi-
lateral Disarmament and Development Assistance, 91 COLuM. L. REv. 993, 997.98
(1991).
100. See Han, supra note 15.
101. Remarks by Abdikarim A. Omar, former Ambassador of Somalia to the Unit-
ed States, in course, United Nations Peace Operations, held at the Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center, Summer 1995.
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Disarmament alone is not enough."'2 There must exist the presence
of other, more powerful factors, such as participatory pluralism and an
effective deterrence system, in order to create the conditions for disar-
mament. As explained by one scholar, "[e]ffective security must pre-
cede disarmament.""
III. STRUCTURAL INADEQUACIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS' °4
This section sets forth a critical examination of the authority and abili-
ty of the United Nations to credibly and effectively implement peace-
building as defined in the preceding section. Can the United Nations
implement or enforce the above norms in a manner that is lawful un-
der international law? If not the United Nations, do other institutions
exist that could lawfully implement all or some of these norms? As
demonstrated below, serious structural inadequacies preclude the
meaningful implementation of peace-building. The United Nations and
other existing institutions were created at the end of World War II, at
the beginning of the Cold War, and to implement the transition from
the colonial period. The structure of these organizations and the princi-
ples upon which they are built are not grounded in the transformation
to which the post Cold War era global community is witness in present
times. 5
A. The United Nations and the United Nations Charter
1. The Potential Role of the Security Council
Attempting to apply the provisions of the United Nations Charter
to a peace-building context presents some difficult questions. Can the
Security Council deploy forces in order to implement or enforce the
above norms? Is an unstable regime, characterized by a lack of democ-
racy, sufficient reason for the Security Council to take some form of
action? Does the Security Council have to use force, or can it under-
take other, i.e. economic or social, measures?
There are two important chapters of the United Nations Charter
for purposes of Security Council action. Chapter VI of the Charter,
entitled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," permits consensual, impartial
activity initiated by the Security Council within a state'06 The Unit-
ed Nations' personnel involved in a Chapter VI effort operate in a
102. MOORE ET AL., supra note 20, at 555.
103. Id.
104. The concept of structural inadequacies is from Koplow & Schrag, supra note
99, at 993.
105. See Donald F. McHenry, Ambassador, Peacekeeping in the Post Cold War
Era, 19 S. ILL U. L.J. 107 (1994).
106. U.N. CHARTER art. 36, 9 1.
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country or region with the consent of the parties to the dispute and
cannot take sides in the dispute."7 The Security Council may only
"recommend" actions to resolve the dispute."8 As part of its Chapter
VI functions, the Security Council "may investigate any dispute, or any
situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a
dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute
or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security."'"
In contrast to Chapter VI of the Charter, Chapter VII permits the
Security Council to use coercive, non-consensual force on the basis of a
finding under Article 39 of the Charter."' Article 39 provides as fol-
lows:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accor-
dance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.'
Article 41 provides for the implementation of sanctions not involv-
ing the use of force, such as economic sanctions; 2 Article 42 provides
for the use of military force." Thus, the issue is whether the breach
of the above norms, or the absence of characteristics in a state or re-
gion of these norms, could constitute a "threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression,"114 allowing either economic or mili-
tary "actions" under Chapter VII of the Charter.
Two schools of thought exist on the interpretation of Chapter VII.
One school of thought contends that Chapter VII should be relied upon
to deal only with the more traditional acts of armed force and not to
stop human rights violations, to depose a repressive regime, or to im-
pose stability in a purely civil context.1 5 For purposes of analysis, I
call this school of thought the "interpretivist" school."1
107. SHARP, supra note 4, at 37, 44.
108. Id.
109. U.N. CHARTER art. 34.
110. SHARP, supra note 4, at 37, 44.
111. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
112. 112 U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
113. U.N. CHARTER art. 42,
114. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
115. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
How WE USE IT 254-57 (1994); Michael J. Glennon, Sovereignty and Community
after Haiti: Rethinking Collective Use of Force, 89 AM. J. INTL L. 70 (1995); Oscar
Schachter, Editorial Comment, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 645 (1984).
116. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND MISTRUST 11-40 (1980). The idea for the
term "interpretivist" was drawn from Professor Ely's discussion of this term in the
context of the U.S. Constitution.
272 VOL. 24:2,3
PEACE-BUILDING
There is a great deal of appeal to the interpretivist school. It is
easily read to be consistent with core principles in the Charter. Article
24(1) of the Charter confers on the Security Council "primary responsi-
bility for the maintenance of international peace and security ....
n11 However, Article 24(2) provides that "fi]n discharging these du-
ties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations."" The Purposes of the United Na-
tions are set forth in Article 1 and its Principles in Article 2. Article 1
of the Charter provides, among other things, that the Purposes of the
United Nations are to maintain international peace and security in
accordance with the "principles of justice and international law.""9
Article 2(7) of the Charter provides:
[niothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter;
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.'
Furthermore, Article 2(4) of the Charter provides that "[aill Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."'
Rosalyn Higgins, recently appointed as a judge to the Internation-
al Court of Justice," explains Article 39, in the context of human
rights violations, as follows:
It is ... clear that measures under Articles 41 and 42 depend upon
there having been a finding under Article 39 of the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. No
matter how much one may wish it otherwise, no matter how policy-
directed one might wish choice between alternative meanings to be,
there is simply no getting away from the fact that the Charter
could have allowed for sanctions for gross human-rights violations,
but deliberatively not do so. The only way in which economic or
military sanctions for human-rights purposes could lawfully be
mounted under the Charter is by the legal fiction that human-
rights violations are causing a threat to international peace.'
117. U.N. CHARTER art. 24 J 1; see SHARP, supra note 4, at 37.
118. U.N. CHARTER art. 24 2; see SHARP, supra note 4, at 37.
119. U.N. CHARTER art. 1 1; see SHARP, supra note 4, at 37.
120. U.N. CHARTER art. 2 7.
121. U.N. CHARTER art. 2 4.
122. ICJ Holds Special Elections; Unanimously Elects First Woman to the Court,
ASIL NEWSL, June-Aug. 1995, at 19.
123. HIGGINS, supra note 115, at 255 (emphasis in original).
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Professor Higgins concludes that it is too early to determine whether a
norm is emerging but that there is an "increasing tendency" for the
Security Council to characterize humanitarian problems as threats to
or breaches of the peace and to thus bring them within the scope of
Chapter VII. 2
An analysis of the articles in Chapter VII, particularly Articles 41
and 42, indicates that Chapter VII was not intended to cover peace-
building situations. A teleological interpretation of Chapter VII indi-
cates that it is designed to address acts of armed aggression in an
international conflict. For example, Article 41 allows for "interruption
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio,
and other means of communication. .. . "" These are hardly mea-
sures that appear to be required for peace-building based on the above
norms. Chapter VII seems designed mainly to deal with short-term in-
ternational crises involving armed force.
A broad reading of Chapter VII to address human rights prob-
lems, repressive regimes, or humanitarian needs has been viewed as
inconsistent with the principle of sovereignty." In traditional inter-
national law parlance, the form and structure of a government, a
government's tendency to commit human rights violations within its
borders, and a government's respect for rule of law are irrelevant to
triggering Chapter VII Indeed, the United Nation's is in part
"based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Mem-
bers."1" The core of the United Nations' collective security system is
the sovereignty of the nation-state. Broadly based Security Council
actions focused on domestic conditions in a country would, the argu-
ment goes, allow powerful states to interfere in the domestic affairs of
weaker states.' As explained by Professor Michael Glennon in the
context of Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda, the terms necessary to trigger
Article 39, namely, a breach of or threat to the peace:
... are left undefined by the Charter. At a minimum, breach of the
peace would seem to imply some violation of sovereignty or cross-
border intervention causing armed conflict, and a threat to the
peace would thus entail the creation of an unreasonable risk of
such an occurrence. Absent these elements, the possibility of Secu-
rity Council interference in member states' internal affairs is too
great, and the Charter flatly prohibits the United Nations from in-
terfering in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states. True,
124. Id. at 256-57.
125. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
126. See Mark R. Hutchinson, Restoring Hope: U.N. Security Council Resolutions
for Somalia and an Expanded Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 34 HARV. INT'
L.J. 624, 636 (1993).
127. Glennon, supra note 115, at 71.
128. U.N. CHARTER art. 2 1.
129. Hutchinson, supra note 126, at 636.
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this provision does indicate that it ought not to be construed as
prejudicing the application of enforcement measure under chapter
VII; but that proviso need merely be read as requiring that the two
provisions be construed together, as allowing only those enforce-
ment measures that do not conflict with a state's domestic jurisdic-
tion." '
Professor Glennon concludes that without "safeguards," which he ar-
gues do not yet exist, the United Nations should adhere to the princi-
ple of non-interference in domestic affairs of states."3 ' Professor
Glennon's analysis is clearly grounded in the language of Article 2(4)
which requires that members of the United Nations "refrain... from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state ....
The second school of thought contends that Chapter VII covers a
broad array of activities which might be deemed a breach of or threat
to peace, including serious human rights violations and other ostensi-
bly domestic actions.' For purposes of analysis, I call this school of
thought the "substantivist" school. This school of thought appears to be
emerging as the dominant school, both in inquiry by scholars and in
action by the Security Council. Without a proper legal framework for
this school, however, the world is left with a basic indeterminate as to
the role of the Security Council.
This competing school of thought, in its basic conception, contends
that a framework for international law, based solely on a set of rules,
is impracticable; international law should serve conceptions of commu-
nity-based policy, particularly because of rapid change in the interna-
tional community. "" Substantivists seek a basis for authority on a
supranational basis which transcends the nation-state. Sovereignty, in
this conception, is held by the people of a country and not by the rul-
ing elites who have been able to use sovereignty as a shield against
scrutiny of repression and corruption.3  Within this framework, sov-
ereignty has as its base a conception that results in rules or principles
to determine who is entitled to assert it on behalf of a state.
The Charter could be read to be consistent with this approach,
too. The Charter's Preamble and its statement of Purposes in Article 1
"clearly recognized the intimate interdependence, if not identity, of
peace and human rights and made the protection of human rights
130. Glennon, supra note 115, at 72.
131. Id. at 74.
132. U.N. CHARTER art. 2 1 4.
133. See McDougal, supra note 2; W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determi-
nation: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984); Reisman,
supra note 52; Turner, supra note 18.
134. McDougal, supra note 2, at 4.
135. Reisman, supra note 53, at 795.
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coordinate with the maintenance of peace."3 ' The drafters of Article
2(7) of the Charter, however, intended to preclude the Charter's hu-
man rights provisions from being construed to provide the United
Nations with the authority to intervene in states' domestic affairs.'"
Notwithstanding the original intent for Article 2(7), subsequent
developments allow for new interpretations of the Charter while main-
taining the rule of law. International law evolves as a matter of cus-
tom and state practice.' The Charter should be interpreted in accor-
dance with this evolving nature of international law. International law
has changed dramatically since 1945. Subjecting the Charter to some
type of "framers' intent" analysis could be deleterious to the evolution
of international law and could render the Charter of limited signifi-
cance or even meaningless. Further, freezing the Charter in time
would seriously distort the purposes of the Charter and hamper efforts
to allow the collective security system envisioned by the framers to
respond to change in the international legal and political order. This
does not mean that the Charter should be interpreted in an undisci-
plined, result-oriented manner, but looking to the framers' intent as
the sole or primary focus would prove pedantic. The world is undergo-
ing transformation in the post Cold War era; some countries are able
to agree on political provisions in international agreements and for
international institutions, the content of which they could never agree
upon during the Cold War." Any sound interpretation of the Char-
ter must reflect developments in international law; such an interpre-
tation would enhance, not injure, the concept of world order through
law.
Indeed, this evolving approach to Charter interpretation is the
only approach which would seem to be consistent with the doctrine of
jus cogens. Certain international law principles are so fundamental so
as to be non-derogable. These principles must be respected regardless
of the Charter provisions; these principles supersede treaties." Since
jus cogens can evolve over time, the Charter also must evolve, or it will
become an unworkable instrument.
The substantivist approach to interpreting the Charter is consis-
tent with the manner in which the United States Constitution has
been interpreted throughout most of United States history. It is a
method of interpretation that acknowledges the difficulties of seman-
136. McDougal, supra note 2, at 13.
137. 10 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 83 (1945), quoted in MOORE ET AL, supra note 20, at
677.
138. See International Court of Justice Statute art. 38; Restatement of the Law of
Foreign Relations §102.
139. See John W. Head, Supranational Law: How the Move Toward Multilateral
Solutions is Changing the Character of "International* Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 605
(1994).
140. Shihata, supra note 54, at 35.
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tics and linguistics, and how abstractions in language can fail to allow
for definitive resolutions in a consistent manner in each case."' As
explained by Karl Llewellyn, postulated in the context of the United
States Constitution, the Charter should be viewed as an institution
rather than as a document."2
Under the substantivist approach, the scope of Article 2(7) shrinks
considerably." Security Council actions to enforce democracy and
rule of law do not implicate Article 2(4) because there is no violation of
"political independence" or "territorial integrity."'" "Threats to the
peace" or "breaches of the peace" under Article 39 could conceivably en-
compass a wide range of peace-building initiatives. Security Council
actions consistent with this approach have already occurred in Haiti,
Somalia, and Rwanda.
The substantivist approach provides the United Nations with
considerable flexibility. Of course, this method of interpretation must
be principled. As explained by Professor Reisman:
there is a limit to 'institutional elasticity,' i.e., the extent to which
institutions created and still used for other purposes can be
'stretched' in order to get them to perform human rights functions,
especially when these functions are accomplished at the expense of
their manifest functions. Institutions simply cannot do everything
we think they are capable of, if this requires them to move too far
from their manifest mandate." 6
Even if one concludes that the Security Council does have the
authority to engage in peace-building, that conclusion does not answer
the question of the specific measures available to the Security Council.
The implications for Security Council involvement are radical in na-
ture. Could the Security Council use or approve military force by its
members to overthrow a non-democratic government? One can see the
need for such action in certain contexts. But repressive regimes often
commit other destabilizing actions, such as genocide and armed at-
tacks of neighboring countries, so that reliance by the Security Council
on the lack of democracy alone may prove unnecessary. '
141. See KN. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 1
(1934); ELY, supra note 116, at 1-41. Cf McDougal and Feliciano, Goal Clarification
by Configurative Analysis: An Alternative Conception 154-55, in LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961), quoted in MOORE ET AL., supra note 20, at 94.
142. Llewellyn, supra note 141.
143. See MOORE ET AL, supra note 20, at 678.
144. Turner, supra note 18, at 24-25.
145. Hutchinson, supra note 126; Turner, supra note 18.
146. W. Michael Reisman, Through or Despite Governments: Differentiated Respon-
sibilities in Human Rights Programs, 72 IOWA L. REV. 391, 395 (1987).
147. New Global Order, supra note 24, at 640.
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In some cases, a coercive force would be unnecessary or imprudent
for peace-building.1" Election monitoring, non-violent pressure, and
proactive development assistance may prove sufficient in some situa-
tions. The Security Council, however, may not be the appropriate body
to undertake such actions.
The -extent of United Nations involvement in peace-building hing-
es to a great degree on whether the United Nations relies upon Chap-
ter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter. Although effectively used in the
past, Chapter VI may prove ineffective in post Cold War peace-
building. It is intended primarily to facilitate the process of decoloniza-
tion and the achievement of independence of former colonies. "9 An
examination of the peace-building efforts of the United Nations to date
reveals that these efforts have been limited in scope and that they
have been, with a few notable exceptions, Chapter VI actions."
Chapters VI and VII of the Charter provide awkward and difficult
authority for United Nations peace-building. Reliance on the Security
Council seems to be unsatisfactory for effective peace-building.
2. If Not the Security Council, Then What Other Body?
Looking elsewhere for peace-building authority, outside of the
jurisdiction of the Security Council, leaves one pessimistic. The Eco-
nomic and Social Council would seem at first blush to be either an
alternative or a complement to the Security Council, depending on the
situation. The Charter provides that the Economic and Social Council
"may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the
Security Council upon its request.""'
The Economic and Social Council has proven to be ineffective. Its
ineffectiveness is largely due to the fact that it is a body of inquiry and
not of action, subservient to the General Assembly and the Security
Council. It essentially functions as an organization to study problems.
Given the problems of that plague many bureaucracies, it is doubtful
whether the Economic and Social Council could be remade, even if the
applicable Charter provisions were rewritten.
The anachronistic character of the Charter is further illustrated
by a review of Chapter XII, which established the trusteeship system
for territories that are not yet states, and Chapter XIII, which estab-
lished the Trusteeship Council. If any section of the Charter shows the
Charter's emphasis on decolonization, it is these sections. Today, these
148. Id. at 628.
149. DEPARMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, UNITED NATIONS, EVERYONE'S UNITED
NATIONS: A HANDBOOK ON THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 98-99 (10th ed.
1986).
150. See generally Han, supra note 15.
151. U.N. CHARTER art. 65.
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sections take up an inordinate amount of space in the Charter, al-
though they once dealt with pressing issues. Most trust territories
have made the transition to statehood; therefore, the Trusteeship
Council has very little to do. In fact, current members of the United
Nations are exempt from the trusteeship system."5 2 It would be offen-
sive to place a country into such a system; it could appear to be a re-
version to colonial rule. Trust administration has a very small role in
the post Cold War world. The Trusteeship Council is on the extreme
margins of the pressing problems of the world.
There have been other organizations established under the auspic-
es of the United Nations, in response to problems of the day, which are
not specified in the Charter. For example, the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development was established as an alternative to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to provide developing
countries with stronger representation in international trade mat-
ters.' The Human Rights Commission, another example, was estab-
lished to promote human rights.1 ' These organizations are not well
funded, are ad hoc in nature, and spend most of their time in the in-
quiry stages. In their present structure, these organizations would not
be effective in implementing peace-building.
B. The "Economic" Institutions
In 1944, during the same time period in which the United Nations
Charter was being formulated at Dumbarton Oaks and later in San
Francisco, the Monetary and Financial Conference was held in Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire.1" The IMF and the World Bank were
formed as a result of the Bretton Woods Conference.15
The IMF was created to promote and to maintain relative ex-
change rate stability, to alleviate short-run balance of payments prob-
lems, and to establish an orderly method for countries' exchange rate
payments. 57 Although not created with any special emphasis on de-
veloping countries, since, at the time of its creation, many countries
were only at the beginning of their decolonization, the IMF role has
evolved and the IMF has been involved in the efforts of developing
countries to promote structural adjustment.' The IMF will make
loans and stand-by arrangements with countries only on the basis of
152. U.N. CHARTER art 78.
153. Brown, supra note 82, at 360.
154. New Global Order, supra note 24, at 619.
155. Brown, supra note 82, at 352.
156. Id.
157. See DAViD D. DRiScOLL, THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK- How Do THEY
DimaE? 2-3 (1994).
158. Brown, supra note 82, at 352-53.
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strict conditionality.W The lenders must adhere to rigorous macro-
economic policies in order to draw down IMF facilities. This condition-
ality also helps to establish the creditworthiness of borrower countries
for loans from other sources." °
The World Bank was initially established in order to finance the
reconstruction of countries ravaged by World War II and to finance the
development of developing countries.'61 The Bank's focus today is on
the elimination of poverty. It has evolved considerably over the years
and is now the primary development banker in the world. The World
Bank makes project-based as well as policy-based loans, structural
adjustment. 2 There exist also regional development banks, such as
the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank,
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and
the African Development Bank; however, their portfolios are far small-
er than the World Bank's portfolio.
Although these institutions can do a great deal to promote devel-
opment throughout the world, they are far from the ideal institutions
for peace-building. As a threshold matter, all of these institutions, with
the exception of the EBRD, are expressly prohibited from taking politi-
cal considerations into account." With the exception of the
EBRD,' these are institutions of the Cold War. Moreover, these in-
stitutions require a fairly stable environment in which to work. They
lend and otherwise deal with money. As lenders, they must protect the
159. Id. at 352; STEPHAN III ET AL, supra note 89, at 244-46.
160. Brown, supra note 82, at 352.
161. Brown, supra note 82, at 353; DRISCOLL, supra note 157, at 6-7.
162. For a general description of the World Bank's activities, see STEPHAN III ET
AL, supra note 89.
163. Article 1 of the World Bank's Articles of Agreement provides as follows:
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of
any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the polit-
ical character of the member or members concerned. Only economic
considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these consider-
ations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes
stated in Article I.
Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, amended by Dec. 16, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942. A similar
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etary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401 (1947); amended by July 28, 1969, 20
U.S.T. 2775 and Apr. 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203. See Cahn, supra note 39, at 163
(arguing that the World Bank violates the above provision); Margaret Conklin &
Daphne Davidson, The LM.F. and Economic and Social Human Rights: A Case
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assets of their shareholders and creditors and must avoid transactions
in which there is an undue amount of political risk.' The World
Bank must consider political risk just as any other lender.'" Al-
though a development bank, such as the World Bank, can take risks
which are greater than a commercial bank, there still must be an ac-
ceptable minimum level of political stability and security in a country
or loan proceeds would be wasted. Good governance in the borrowing
country is an important precedent to development lending."7
. The Bretton Woods institutions can do little to assist those coun-
tries at the early stages of peace-building. They can become involved
only at a point of time in which a country is substantially on the road
to political stability. Thus, there is a void between United Nations
functions in peace-building and that of the Bretton Woods institutions.
Situations can conceivably arise in a country in which there is no live
conflict or dispute which the United Nations can seek to resolve but in
which the Bretton Woods Institutions can have no or marginal involve-
ment.
C. Regional and Non-governmental Organizations
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter addresses "Regional
Arrangements."'" Article 52 of Chapter VIII provides as follows:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security as are appro-
priate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or
agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations."
Regional organizations have played roles mainly in the pacific settle-
ment of disputes under Chapter VI and not in coercive actions under
Chapter VII." But, certain non-governmental organizations, such as
the International Committee for the Red Cross, can play significant
roles in Chapter VII operations. 7'
The roles of regional organizations and non-governmental organi-
zations in peace-building are limited. Many of these organizations
suffer from even more financial and bureaucratic constraints than
those from which the United Nations suffers. 7 ' They are further con-
165. See IBRAHiM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SE-
LECTED ESSAYS 62-78 (Franziska Tschofen & Antonio R. Para eds., 1991).
166. 1&
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171. Id at 70-72.
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strained by their limited mandates and the often lukewarm support of
their membership. Non-governmental organizations can be granted
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council. 73 Thus,
they can have only a restricted role in an organization that at present
itself has only limited role in peace-building. 7 " These organizations
do not present an effective supranational ability to implement peace-
building. At most, in their present state, they can perform complemen-
tary or subsidiary functions.
D. Unilateral Actions
An alternative to collective action in the peace-building area is
unilateral action by single states. This approach may work in limited
circumstances. As a general method of peace-building, unilateral action
is imprudent for a number of reasons.
No one state could be able to take on such a daunting task. In-
deed, no one state could afford to take on such a role from a financial
point of view. Multilateral actions are prudent because they allow a
"leveraging" of principles as well as resources. 7
Unilateral action may violate international law principles of non-
intervention. Some have suggested that unilateral intervention to sup-
port new democracies would be appropriate. T' Such an approach
could serve to avoid the problem of instability in new democracies. 7
The concept of non-intervention or non-interference in the internal
affairs of a state are sometimes used to prop up oppressive elites with-
in a country.
The problem of determining when and in what circumstances
action to support a democracy would be appropriate provides strong
justification for the collective security system which forms the basis for
the United Nations Charter based order. Peace-building should be
implemented within a collective structure to avoid problems of credibil-
ity and charges of neocolonialism and selective and unjust en--
forcement. As explained by Professor Franck in the context of the
emerging right to democratic entitlement, "Itihat a new rule might au-
United Nations Peace Operations, offered at the Georgetown University Law Center,
Summer 1995.
173. U.N. CHARTER art. 71; see SHARP, supra note 4, at 70.
174. See supra part III.A.
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cial] institutions allow the West to leverage principles. Few governments are prone
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thorize actions to enforce democracy still conjures up just such chilling
images to weaker states, which see themselves as the potential objects
of enforcement of dubious democratic norms under circumstances of
doubtful probity."' The challenge of peace-building remains in the
possibilities of implementing effective collective action, outside of mili-
tary action, under Chapter VII of the Charter. That the collective secu-
rity system has failed in some cases to provide relief to new democ-
racies does not justify its abandonment. Rather, it would seem that a
strengthening of the collective system would prevent egregious situa-
tions from "falling through the cracks."
IV. CONCLUSION
A significant evolution of international law principles relevant to
peace-building appears to be taking place. Changing principles of sov-
ereignty and non-intervention are causing a shrinking domaine reserve
for states and expanded views on the appropriateness of humanitarian
intervention. 79 The veil of sovereignty is being pierced by the evolu-
tion of human rights principles. Traditional principles governing state
succession are giving way to concepts of popular sovereignty and legiti-
mization of governments through proper elections."s Some scholars
have asserted an emerging norm of democratic entitlement.'' Ex-
panded views of the principle of self determination, beyond the view
that it is merely a concept applicable to decolonization, are
emerging.
18 2
Whether these principles are aspirational ideas of scholars or
positivist conceptions of international law has yet to be definitively
determined. Peace-building can provide the framework for that deter-
mination. From a pragmatic standpoint, however, it is doubtful that
the United Nations, or any other institution, can provide a comprehen-
sive institutional base for peace-building. Coordination among insti-
tutions should help but will not result in an effective institutional
structure. Structural inadequacies in the current state of affairs create
a chasm between the United Nations and other institutions.' Some
countries and regions in dire need of peace-building will go unserviced,
with the result being continued conflict and need for traditional United
Nations peace operations. In this article, I have attempted to lay the
groundwork for some new thinking about peace-building and world
peace through law.
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